Why Linktree Is Trying to Become a Store.
By Creatives Takeover Editorial Team · November 16, 2026
Owning the traffic is not the same as owning the transaction.
For most of its history, Linktree has been one of the most widely used pages on the internet that almost nobody meant to visit. Its entire purpose was to send people somewhere else: to a new song, a concert ticket, a YouTube video, an online store. The company says more than 70 million people now use it, and its little green pages sit behind the bios of musicians, creators, small businesses and global brands.
Yet for a company that sits at the doorway of so much online activity, Linktree has historically captured remarkably little of the value that passes through it. That is now changing. Over the past three years, Linktree has added shops, sponsored links, affiliate storefronts, digital product sales and courses, and acquired a series of smaller companies along the way. The tool that was built to point people toward a purchase is now trying to become the place where the purchase happens.
A Six Hour Fix That Became a Company
Linktree began as a solution to an operational headache. In 2016, brothers Alex and Anthony Zaccaria and their friend Nick Humphreys were running Bolster, a Melbourne digital agency that served musicians, festivals and entertainment brands. Instagram allowed only one link in a profile, while their clients needed to promote new releases, ticket sales and merchandise at the same time. Every campaign meant manually swapping the single link in a client’s bio. The founders asked their developer to build a page that could hold several links behind one URL. The prototype took about six hours to build, and it reportedly attracted 3,000 users overnight, enough to crash the server.
For several years, Linktree remained a side project while the founders focused on their agency. It survived an early scare in 2018, when Instagram temporarily blocked Linktree links over community guideline concerns, a decision reversed after thousands of users advocated on its behalf. By March 2020, the company still had only seven employees.
The pandemic changed its trajectory. As venues closed and tours were cancelled, Bolster’s event and music business collapsed, while Linktree surged alongside the boom in online content creation. The company stayed bootstrapped and cash flow positive until October 2020, when it raised a $10.7 million Series A. A $45 million Series B followed in 2021, and in March 2022 it raised $110 million at a $1.3 billion valuation, making it one of Australia’s best known startups. Linktree had effectively created the link in bio category, and become the default tool for millions of people.
Seventy Million Users, Still Very Little Revenue
Linktree’s scale has never been in doubt. Its business model has. The core product is free, and most users have little reason to upgrade. A simple list of links is easy to set up, easy to understand and, for the majority of people, entirely sufficient.
The numbers reflect that tension. According to research firm Contrary, Linktree reported $25 million in revenue in 2022, the same year it cut 17% of its workforce, at a time when it had more than 35 million users. That works out to less than one dollar of revenue per user per year. Press coverage of its 2023 accounts reported that revenue had grown, but that the company’s net loss still exceeded its revenue. Sacra, which tracks private company performance, estimates that Linktree generated about $55.5 million in revenue in 2024. That is healthy growth, but modest for a company valued at $1.3 billion and used by tens of millions of people.
The deeper issue is structural. Linktree’s core function is to send visitors away. When a fan taps a link to buy concert tickets, the sale happens on a ticketing site. When someone clicks through to a product, the purchase happens on Amazon or Shopify. Linktree carries the traffic but rarely participates in the transaction. In practical terms, it has been operating as the front door of millions of small businesses without collecting any rent on what happens inside.
Building on Someone Else’s Rule
Linktree also carries a risk familiar to any company built on top of a larger platform. Its original reason to exist was a limitation imposed by Instagram. If Instagram removed that limitation, the most basic version of Linktree would lose much of its purpose.
In 2023, that scenario appeared to arrive. Instagram announced that users could add up to five links to their bios, and commentators, including Wired, openly questioned whether the change could prove fatal for Linktree and competitors such as Lnk.Bio and Beacons. The outcome was more nuanced. Cofounder Alex Zaccaria later told Capital Brief that Linktree’s traffic from Instagram increased 45% after the change. His explanation was that by exposing more than a billion users to the idea of multiple links, Instagram had created a larger audience of people who would eventually want something more sophisticated than a short list.
The episode was a reprieve, but also a warning. A product whose primary value is working around another platform’s rules is always one product update away from being made redundant. Linktree survived the five link change because it had already begun to offer more than links: design, analytics, integrations and a recognizable brand. To secure its future, it needed to go further and become a destination with value of its own.
From Front Door to Storefront
Linktree’s answer has been to stop acting only as a doorway and start becoming part of the transaction. The clearest step came on April 23, 2025, when the company launched a suite of monetization tools gathered under a new section called Earn. Creators in the United States could now sell online courses directly from their Linktree through a partnership with Kajabi, sell digital products natively, and build shoppable storefronts that earn commission on products from brands such as Target, Amazon, Lululemon and Revolve. Analysts tracking the company report that the Shops program now includes more than 150 brand partners.
The launch also introduced Sponsored Links, which allow brands to pay for a clearly labeled placement on a creator’s page. A creator might, for example, earn money when a follower subscribes to Hulu through their Linktree. A rewards program offers bonus commissions and brand introductions to creators who reach certain milestones, and all earnings flow into a single wallet inside the platform. Alex Zaccaria framed the strategy as solving a problem on both sides of the market: creators had been forced to stitch together separate tools to make money, while brands had been guessing where to spend.
Acquisitions have supported the same direction. One competitive analysis counts five acquisitions since 2023, and its purchase of Melbourne competitor Fingertip ended with Fingertip’s users being migrated to Linktree and the product wound down in 2026. Taken together, these moves describe a company trying to change what it is. Rather than charging a small subscription to a minority of users for better links, Linktree wants to take a share of the money that flows through its pages, through commissions, transaction fees and brand spending. If it succeeds, its revenue would grow with the commercial success of its creators rather than the number of people willing to pay for premium features.
The Risks of Becoming a Store
The pivot is strategically logical, but it is not without risk. The first is competition. In commerce, Linktree is no longer competing only with other link in bio tools. It is competing with Shopify, Kajabi, Patreon and Stan, and with social platforms that increasingly want transactions to happen inside their own apps. Smaller rivals such as Beacons have built their products around selling from the start, and position themselves on lower fees and stronger conversion tools.
The second risk is creator goodwill. Linktree’s original appeal was its simplicity and its generous free plan. As the company works harder to monetize, some users have pushed back. Comparison sites tracking the category report that Linktree raised the price of its Pro plan from $9 to $15 a month in late 2025, and that transaction fees on lower tiers have become a common reason creators cite for exploring alternatives. When a product’s value depends on being the default choice, every price increase tests how much of that position is loyalty and how much is habit.
The third risk is internal. Building a commerce platform requires different capabilities from building a simple page builder, from payments and compliance to brand partnerships and merchant support. Linktree has also gone through repeated restructuring, including a reported cut of 27% of its headcount, concentrated in Australia and New Zealand, as it shifted its focus toward the United States. Executing a major strategic transition while reducing staff is difficult for any company, and Linktree is attempting it in one of the most competitive corners of the creator economy.
What this Actually Means for a Founder Building Right Now
Linktree’s journey offers a useful lesson for any founder whose product sits in the middle of someone else’s activity. Attracting users and capturing value are two different problems. A tool that is free, simple and widely used can become a category leader while still struggling to build a sustainable business, because the value it creates is realized somewhere else.
Founders should ask early where the money in their users’ workflow actually changes hands, and how close their product sits to that moment. A product that helps people get to a purchase is useful. A product that participates in the purchase, through payments, commissions or transaction fees, is usually far more valuable, because its revenue grows as its customers succeed. Designing for that position from the start is considerably easier than adding it after tens of millions of users have grown accustomed to a free product.
Linktree also illustrates the importance of reducing platform dependency over time. Building on top of a larger platform can be an extraordinary growth engine, as Instagram was for Linktree. But a business that exists primarily to work around another company’s limitations should use that period of growth to build value the platform cannot easily replicate: data, relationships, tools and revenue streams that belong to the business itself.
Five Things Worth Taking From This
1. Reach and revenue are different achievements. Linktree built a product used by tens of millions of people, yet in 2022 it generated less than one dollar of revenue per user. Distribution alone does not create a business model.
2. Sitting near the transaction is not the same as owning it. Linktree directed enormous volumes of traffic to purchases that happened elsewhere. Its commerce pivot is an attempt to capture value at the point where money actually moves.
3. Platform dependency can work in both directions. Instagram’s single link rule created Linktree, and its five link update was expected to hurt it. Instead, Linktree reported a 45% rise in Instagram traffic, but only because it had already built value beyond the workaround.
4. Aligning with customer success creates stronger economics. Commissions, transaction fees and sponsored placements grow when creators earn more, unlike flat subscriptions that depend on persuading users to upgrade.
5. Monetizing a free audience late carries real costs. Price increases and new fees test the loyalty of users who joined for a free, simple product. The earlier a business defines how it will capture value, the easier that transition becomes.
Linktree was born from a six hour effort to solve one frustrating rule on one social network. Ten years later, it has become the front page for a significant part of the creator economy. Its next chapter will test whether a product people use almost reflexively can also become one they rely on to earn a living. If Linktree succeeds, it will have completed one of the more difficult transitions in consumer technology: from a utility that points elsewhere to a platform where value is created and captured.